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MAKING SINCE CHINA’S RESUMPTION 
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ERIC C. IP∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In contemporary Hong Kong, China’s first special administrative 
region, administrative law has become ever more influential over 
government decision-making, notwithstanding the semi-authoritarian 
political framework of the territory. Contrary to existing scholarship, this 
Article argues that neither rule-of-law concerns nor misguided judicial 
adventures satisfactorily explain the evolution of administrative law in this 
former British colony. Administrative law doctrines are better understood 
as decisional devices developed to promote “administrative efficiency,” 
achieved through the reduction of agency costs inflicted by administrative 
agencies due to imperfect compliance with statutory goals on their 
political principal—the Hong Kong Legislative Council—to the optimal 
point where further reduction would yield no benefit to the latter, and the 
de facto imposition of minimal Kaldor-Hicks efficiency requirements on 
agency policy outcomes when substantive statutory goals are ambiguous. 
This Article conjectures that, given the absence of any enabling 
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administrative procedure act, judges’ desire for popular legitimacy and 
reputation, fear of legislative reversals, and practical needs to conserve 
their scarce resources explain the underlying design of these doctrines. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“Hong Kong SAR”) 
was established on July 1, 1997 pursuant to the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration of 1984,1 a binding international treaty registered with the 
United Nations forged between two veto-wielding Permanent Members of 
the Security Council–the People’s Republic of China and the United 
Kingdom. Since then, the ability of the territory’s Westernized legal, 
market, and political institutions to thrive under Chinese sovereignty has 
attracted the attention of governments, businesses, and international 
organizations with interests in East Asia and beyond.2 Of particular 
interest is whether the imported common law’s traditional constraints over 
government decision-making can still be rigorously enforced after the 
withdrawal of British rule. Formally, the Hong Kong Basic Law,3 enacted 
in accord with the Joint Declaration, precluded the applicability of more 
than 99% of all mainland Chinese laws over the SAR,4 and conserved 
much of the former colony’s separate identity, including its capitalist 
economy, multi-party legislature, common law judiciary, and the civil 
rights of residents, including the right “to institute legal proceedings in the 
courts against the acts of the executive authorities and their personnel.”5 
China’s own rapid economic growth has benefited and should continue to 
benefit immensely from the continuation of Hong Kong’s world class 
legal and economic arrangements.6 But a rule-of-law oasis on the Chinese 
 
 
 1. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, U.K.-
China, Dec. 19, 1984, 1399 U.N.T.S. 61. 
 2. Michael Davis, The Basic Law and Democratization in Hong Kong, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. 
REV. 165 (2006). For example, the United States enacted the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act S. 
1731 in 1992 to delineate its relationship with the Hong Kong SAR as an entity that is practically 
different from the People’s Republic of China. 
 3. BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (H.K.) [hereinafter H.K.B.L.]. 
 4. H.K.B.L. art. 8 (H.K.); Albert Chen, The Theory, Constitution and Practice of Autonomy: 
The Case of Hong Kong, in One Country, Two Systems, Three Legal Orders–Perspectives of 
Evolution: Essays on Macau’s Autonomy after the Resumption of Sovereignty by China (Jorge 
Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal eds., 2009). 
 5. H.K.B.L. art. 35 (H.K.). 
 6. See generally Peter Cheung, Who’s Influencing Whom? Exploring the Influence of Hong 
Kong on Politics and Governance in China, 51 ASIAN SURVEY 713 (2011). 
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periphery might become the tail that wags the dog,7 and thus, may not 
always be perceived as desirable by the Party-state.8 
Undoubtedly due to the magnitude of China’s social and economic 
transformation since 1978, mainland administrative law has taken a very 
different approach from that of Hong Kong’s.9 Administrative law, instead 
of constituting a genuine constraint on administrative discretion, has 
served primarily as an instrument for retroactive and prospective legal 
legitimization of the decisions of powerful bureaucrats charged with 
implementing China’s massive market reforms.10 Nonetheless, the Chinese 
government continued to treat judicial review with great caution.11 This 
concern has been reflected in the myriad administrative law statutes 
enacted by the National People’s Congress12 which feature relatively few 
clear provisions sanctioning illegal agency conduct by judicial means.13 
Bureaucratic bodies, often acting against the express letter of the law, have 
benefitted substantially from the development of mainland China’s 
administrative law regime in the past twenty years.14  
 
 
 7. See generally Andrew Scobell, Hong Kong’s Influence on China: The Tail that Wags the 
Dog?, 28 ASIAN SURVEY 599 (1988). 
 8. YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL RIGHTS, AND THE 
SCOPE OF THE STATE 275 (2002). 
 9. See generally Albert Chen, Reflections on Administrative Law in China: A Hong Kong 
Perspective, 6 HARV. CHINA REV. 66 (2010). 
 10. See generally Tom Ginsburg, Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents in 
Authoritarian Regimes, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 58 
(Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008). 
11. For example, the Administrative Procedure Law (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 
4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), arts. 1, 2, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/newLaws/admin 
LitigationENG.php (P.R.C.), provides that the scope of review of “concrete” administrative acts shall 
extend no further than infringements against bodily and property rights of private parties, and excludes 
from review “abstract” acts such as generally binding commands and decisions and “final” agency 
decisions made “according to law.” Furthermore, the Administrative Reconsideration Law 
(promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) 
(P.R.C.), creates an additional layer of bureaucratic adjudication that must be exhausted before judicial 
review becomes available. See Eric Ip, The Supreme People’s Court and the Political Economy of 
Judicial Empowerment in Contemporary China, 25 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 367 (2011); Eric Ip, Judicial 
Review in China: A Positive Political Economy Analysis, 8 REV. L. & ECON. 331 (2012). 
 12. See, e.g., the State Compensation Law (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., May 12, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) (P.R.C.), the Administrative Penalty Law (promulgated 
by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996) (P.R.C.), the Administrative 
Supervision Law (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 9, 1997, effective May 
9, 1997) (P.R.C.), the Administrative Reconsideration Law (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) (P.R.C.), the Administrative Licensing Law (promulgated by 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004) (P.R.C.), and the 
Administrative Compulsory Enforcement Law (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., June 30, 2011, effective Jan. 1, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
 13. ALBERT CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 333 (4th ed. 2011). 
 14. MINXIN PEI, CHINA TRAPPED IN TRANSITION: THE DEVELOPMENTAL LIMITS OF AUTOCRACY 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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By contrast, administrative law has become ever more influential in 
Hong Kong after the transfer of sovereignty, notwithstanding the 
persistence of “authoritarian”15 and “autocratic”16 politics. Often tackling 
divisive political issues,17 judicial review of administrative action has been 
described as economically, socially, and politically consequential,18 due to 
its encroachment on such policy domains as aviation,19 censorship,20 
educational policy,21 environmental policy,22 financial regulation,23 public 
health,24 immigration,25 land policy,26 professional licensing,27 pharmacy,28 
privatization,29 public housing,30 reclamation,31 social welfare,32 
telecommunications,33 transportation,34 and so on. Local jurists of Hong 
Kong administrative law conventionally treat considerations of justice,35
 
 
58 (2006). 
 15. Wai-man, Lam, Political Context, in CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG POLITICS: GOVERNANCE 
IN THE POST-1997 ERA 1, 11 (Lam Wai-man et al. eds., 2007). 
 16. NGOK, MA, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG: STATE, POLITICAL SOCIETY, AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY 90 (2007). 
 17. IAN SCOTT, THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN HONG KONG 46 (2010). 
 18. Johannes Chan, Administrative Law, Politics and Governance: The Hong Kong Experience, 
in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 143 (Tom 
Ginsburg & Albert Chen eds., 2009). 
 19. See Cathay Pacific Airways Flight Attendants Union v. The Director-General of Civil 
Aviation, [2007] 2 H.K.C. 393 (C.A.). 
 20. See The Sun News Publisher Ltd. & Anor. v. Comm’r for Television and Entm’t Licensing 
Auth., [2006] H.K.C.U. 1279 (C.F.I.). 
 21. See Lam Yuet Mei v. Permanent Sec. for Educ. and Manpower, [2004] H.K.C.U. 922 
(C.F.I.). 
 22. See Shiu Wing Steel Ltd. v. Dir. of Envtl. Prot., [2006] 4 H.K.C. 111 (C.F.A.). 
 23. See Sanyuan Group Ltd. v. Stock Exch. of H.K. Ltd., [2008] 4 H.K.C. 367 (C.F.I.). 
 24. See Lam Che Wai v. Dir. of Food and Envtl. Hygiene, [2003] H.K.C.U. 1389 (C.F.I.). 
 25. See Tam Nga Yin v. The Dir. of Immigration, [2001] H.K.C.U. 661 (C.F.I.). 
 26. See Rank Profit Indus. Ltd. v. Dir. of Lands, [2009] H.K.C.U. 926 (C.F.A.). 
 27. See Law Sze Yan v. The Chinese Med. Practitioners Board of the Chinese Med. Council of 
H.K., [2005] H.K.C.U. 1579 (C.F.I.). 
 28. See Lee Hong Dispensary Superstore Co. Ltd. v. Pharmacy and Poisons Board, [2007] 
H.K.C.U. 379 (C.F.I.). 
 29. See Lo Siu Lan v. H.K. Hous. Auth., [2005] H.K.C.U. 259 (C.A.). 
 30. See Ho Choi Wan v. H.K. Hous. Auth., [2006] H.K.C.U. 18 (C.F.A.). 
 31. See Soc’y for the Prot. of Harbour Ltd. v. Town Planning Board, [2003] 4 H.K.C. 463 
(C.F.I.). 
 32. See Cheung Man Wai v. Dir. of Soc. Welfare, [2000] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 255. (C.A.). 
 33. See PCCW-HKT Tel. Ltd. v. The Telecomm. Auth., [2005] H.K.C.U. 553 (C.A.). 
 34. See Chit Fai Motors Co. Ltd. v. Comm’r for Transp., [2004] 1 H.K.C. 465 (C.A.). 
 35. See generally W.S. Clarke, Judicial Review in Hong Kong in the Nineties, in LAW LECTURES 
FOR PRACTITIONERS 1994, at 296 (1994). 
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2013] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 231 
 
 
 
 
fairness,36 individual rights,37 transparency,38 and redress of power 
abuses39 as determinants of its development. Conversely, mainland 
Chinese scholars who keep an eye on the SAR typically characterize 
judicial review of administrative action as a politicized weapon targeting 
the executive,40 an inefficient constraint on public policy,41 and the vehicle 
of a judicial ambition that seeks to undermine government authority and 
usurp control over social development.42 
In contrast to these two polarized schools of thought, this Article 
argues that Hong Kong’s administrative law doctrines emanating from 
judicial review are not exclusively premised on rule-of-law values or 
undue judicial and social activism. Judges crafted these doctrines as if they 
were reacting to inefficiencies caused by the expansion of the 
administrative state and incongruence between legislative and bureaucratic 
interests. Judge-made administrative law is thus better understood as a set 
of decisional devices developed to promote the reduction of agency costs 
imposed by public administrators on their political principal—the Hong 
Kong Legislative Council—to the optimal point where further reduction 
would yield no benefit to the latter.43 Hence, there arises a positive theory 
of Hong Kong administrative law that leaves to normative theorists 
questions regarding the merits and desirableness of the various doctrines.44 
 
 
 36. BENNY TAI, THE PASSION FOR RULE OF LAW: VALUES BEYOND LEGAL TEXT AND LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS 202 (2010). 
 37. Benedict Lai & Johannes Chan, Remedies in Administrative Law, in EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL 
REVIEW: A CORNERSTONE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 359, 360 (Christopher Forsyth et al. eds., 2010). 
 38. See generally Mark Daly, Judicial Review in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
Necessary Because of Bad Governance, in EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CORNERSTONE OF GOOD 
GOVERNANCE 413 (Christopher Forsyth et al. eds., 2010). 
 39. See generally Philip Dykes, The Functions of Judicial Review in Hong Kong, in EFFECTIVE 
JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CORNERSTONE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 416 (Christopher Forsyth et al. eds., 
2010). 
 40. See, e.g., JIANZHEN HAO, XIANGGANG TEBIE XINGZHENGQU XINGZHENG YU LIFA DE 
GUANXI [EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS IN THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
REGION] (2010). 
 41. See, e.g., CHEN RUILIAN & WANG YONGCHENG, XIANGGANG TEQU GONGGONG GUANLI 
MOSHI YANJIU [A STUDY OF THE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT MODEL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION] 38 (2009). 
 42. See, e.g., Dingwai Zhang, Xianggang de Xingzheng Zhudao Tizhi: Xingzhi, Kunjing yu 
Fazhan [Hong Kong’s System of Executive Dominance: Nature, Problems, and Development], in 
XIANGGANG HUIGUI HOU SHEHUI JINGJI FAZHAN DE HUIGU YU ZHANWANG [HONG KONG’S POST-
REUNIFICATION SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECTS] 248–58 (Chen 
Guanghan et al. eds., 2009); Gao Xuchen, Applicability of Hong Kong Basic Law, in A NEW 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE RULE OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 299 (Li Lin et al. eds., 2011). 
 43. See Tonja Jacobi & Emerson Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 326 (2007). 
 44. I will avoid a discussion of constitutional law in this Article. Constitutional law involves 
judicial decisions that explicitly enforce the Basic Law, which invoke an entirely different principal-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Article is organized as follows. Part II lays out the ideal concept of 
administrative efficiency deployed herein, discussing it in the context of 
Hong Kong public administration. Part III demonstrates how the structure 
of post-1997 administrative law coheres with this ideal of administrative 
efficiency, discussing several conjectures that may explain the underlying 
design of these doctrines. Part IV concludes with a summary of findings. 
II. EFFICIENCY IN THE HONG KONG ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
This Article’s argument draws heavily on two traditions in the 
economic analysis of law: the economic theory of common law,45 which 
theorizes that judge-made law may be understood as a pricing mechanism 
which tends to produce efficient outcomes, and the positive political 
theory, which posits that inter-branch strategic games underlie the causal 
nexus between procedural rules and policy outcomes.46 This article shows 
that Hong Kong administrative law doctrines are consistent with the goals 
of “administrative efficiency” in at least two ways. First, they promote 
optimal compliance of administrative agencies with statutes, which 
express the preferences of their political principal, the Legislative 
Council.47 Second, when the Legislative Council has not unequivocally 
specified its preferences (e.g., when substantive statutory goals are 
ambiguous), they compel agencies’ adherence to the minimal requirements 
of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which ensure beneficiaries of administrative 
 
 
agent relationship wherein the Chinese National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee is the 
principal, and each of all three branches of government in Hong Kong are the agents. This is entirely 
beyond the ambit of the present discussion, which emphasizes the administrative rather than 
constitutional level of analysis. 
 45. The law and economics movement has made progress in many areas of market-related law, 
viz. commercial law, corporate law, antitrust law, and taxation law. See generally Richard Posner, The 
Law and Economics Movement, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: A READER 40 (Alain Marciano ed., 2009). 
Nonetheless, economists and lawyers have exhibited considerable unease in applying it to non-market 
domains such as crimes, torts, the environment, the family, administrative law, constitutional law, 
legal history, and so on. Id. 
 46. See David Law, Introduction: Positive Political Theory and the Law, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 1, 2 (2006).  
 47. See ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 96–97 (2000); KENNETH SHEPSLE, 
ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 424 (2d ed. 2010). A core tenet 
of principal-agent theory is that an increase in agency costs results in a decline in efficiency. See 
RICHARD MCKENZIE & DWIGHT LEE, IN DEFENSE OF MONOPOLY: HOW MARKET POWER FOSTERS 
CREATIVE PRODUCTION 62 (2008); Simon Deakin & Ajit Singh, The Stock Market, the Market for 
Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm: Legal and Economic Perspectives and Implications for 
Public Policy, in THE MODERN FIRM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND INVESTMENT 210 (Per-Olof 
Bjeggren & Denis C. Mueller eds., 2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss2/5
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policies can in principle compensate those who have been injured by those 
policies and remain better off nonetheless.48 
This section analyzes the concept of efficiency in the context of the 
Hong Kong administrative state using the generalized principal-agent 
model. It is assumed that rulers, regardless of their omnipotence, have 
limited material capacity to implement public policy choices.49 
Implementation requires a chain of command by which rulers delegate to 
agents with instructions.50 Despite its relative political weakness vis-à-vis 
the Chief Executive,51 the Legislative Council, as Hong Kong’s principal 
lawmaking organ, has been constitutionally empowered to hold the 
Executive Authorities to account;52 simultaneously, the Executive 
Authorities must duly implement its enactments.53 In the context of 
administrative law, the relationship between the Legislative Council and 
the Executive Authorities is parallel to principal-agent relations in private 
corporations:54 the Legislative Council is analogous to a board of 
directions, exercising broad oversight over managers (the Chief Executive 
and his cabinet), but unable to pay close attention to the daily activities of 
subordinate employees (administrative agencies).55 The Legislative 
Council enacts bills proposed by the Chief Executive (and fine-tuned by 
legislators) into statutes, and delegates their implementation to 
administrative officials, who also have considerable decision-making 
discretion. Such delegation to the modern administrative state is 
commonly justified by the argument that administrators have more 
expertise and experience than politicians, e.g., more accurate information 
about the comparative impacts of different implementation choices.56 
 
 
 48. See CENTO VELJANOVSKI, ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF LAW 33 (2007). 
 49. See Yadira Gonzalez de Lara et al., The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing 
Constitutions, 98 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 105 (2008).  
 50. COOTER, supra note 47, at 80. 
 51. IAN SCOTT, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG: REGIME CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON 
THE PUBLIC SECTOR 283 (2005). 
 52. H.K.B.L. art. 73 empowers the Legislative Council to hold the Executive Authorities to 
account by controlling taxation and public expenditure, questioning and scrutinizing Government 
policies, and debating the Chief Executive’s Policy Addresses to the Council. 
 53. H.K.B.L. art. 64 requires the Executive Authorities to abide by and implement laws enacted 
by the Legislative Council and be accountable to the latter; H.K.B.L. arts. 8 & 18 tacitly preserve the 
British tradition that the Executive Authorities could only enact subordinate legislation as authorized 
by primary legislation made by the Legislative Council, and that the Legislative Council is entitled to 
control the content of subsidiary legislation through the amendment or repeal of relevant primary 
legislation. 
 54. See generally COOTER, supra note 47, at 80. 
 55. See generally FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 4 (2009). 
 56. See generally John D. Huber & Charles R. Shipan, Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy, in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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However, the generalized principal-agent model holds that, as information 
asymmetry intensifies, agents have incentives to pursue courses of action 
inconsistent with the original terms of delegation set by the principals.57 
With better information about the effects of their acts than the principals, 
agents can make choices with impunity that benefit themselves at the 
expense of their principals.58 This is the problem of “agency cost.” 
In public administration, agency costs are those borne by the legislature 
when inducing agencies to faithfully implement legislative intent and 
include the losses arising from the imperfection of inducements.59 These 
costs add to the total cost of public administration and render it less 
efficient.60 As agency costs mount, principals are normally incentivized to 
reclaim their authority by dismissing agents outright or monitoring and 
nudging their behavior. They can do so, however, only insofar as agents’ 
acts are observable.61 Thus, governments around the world enact laws and 
institute mechanisms for policing administrators in order to minimize 
agency costs.62 Agency costs in Hong Kong were low in the British 
colonial era (1842–1997), as principal-agent interests significantly 
overlapped. During that time, senior civil servant-public administrators 
served concurrently as Government ministers as part of the Executive 
Council and as ex officio members of the Legislative Council majority. As 
we shall see, since China’s resumption of sovereignty, the Hong Kong 
SAR’s agency costs have skyrocketed owing to the divergence of identity 
and interests between legislators and administrative officials. 
The British founded what was to become modern Hong Kong on the 
island granted to it by the Treaty of Nanking after its victory in the First 
Anglo-Chinese War over the Manchurian Dynasty that was then ruling 
China. Unlike most British colonies, Hong Kong was meant to be a 
trading outpost rather than a territorial settlement.63 The “expatriates” who 
governed it never numbered more than one percent of the population.64 
 
 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 256 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman 
eds., 2006). 
 57. Matthew Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 469–70 (2007). 
 58. See Tom Ginsburg & Eric Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1585 
(2010). 
 59. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Hybrid Judicial Career Structures: Reputation Versus 
Legal Tradition, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 489 (2011). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Eric Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Solution to a Principal-agent Problem, 53 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 289, 291 (2001). 
 62. COOTER, supra note 47, at 98.  
 63. See Hilda Selwyn-Clarke, Hong Kong Dilemma, 16 FAR EASTERN SURVEY 5 (1947). 
 64. LEO GOODSTADT, UNEASY PARTNERS: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PUBLIC INTEREST AND 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss2/5
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The colony’s strategic importance escalated in the late 1940s and early 
1950s after the United Nations imposed a trade embargo on the new 
Communist government ruling China for its role in the Korean War.65 
Hong Kong became a magnet for refugees fleeing Communism, including 
many who were skillful or wealthy.66 By 1970 it had become Communist 
China’s main economic gateway.67 Nevertheless, Hong Kong was unique 
in the British Empire for such little progress to have been made toward 
representative democracy.68 Indeed, in 1952, the Governor had persuaded 
London to abandon plans for transition to self-rule in face of the threat of 
Communist invasion.69 
Agency costs were virtually negligible during the colonial era. The 
“agents” of the Hong Kong state were the “chameleon-like” tenured senior 
civil servants who staffed ministerial offices, and were formally politically 
neutral, and hence not accountable to any electorate.70 The “principal” was 
the unicameral Legislative Council, which consisted of three parts: the 
White-hall appointed Governor (as President of the Legislative Council ex 
officio), the Official Members (viz. the civil-servant ministers), and the 
Unofficial Members. Together, they exercised wide-ranging powers to 
make laws for “the peace, order, and good government of the Colony.” 
From 1843 to 1976 the Official Members, following a twisted version of 
the Westminster model, constituted the Legislative Council majority.71 
Notwithstanding subsequent electoral reforms, these civil servant-
ministers more or less dominated the legislative agenda until 1997.72 In 
short, the identity and interests of the principal (the Legislative Council) 
and the agents (senior administrative officials) almost entirely overlapped. 
Essentially, the bureaucracy was the sole political institution, 
monopolizing almost all political power in the colony “from policy 
making to policy execution, and from law making to law enforcement.”73 
 
 
PRIVATE PROFIT IN HONG KONG 8 (2005). 
 65. Ming Sing, Introduction, in HONG KONG GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 7 (Ming Sing ed., 
2003). 
 66. JOHN M. CARROLL, A CONCISE HISTORY OF HONG KONG 143 (2007). 
 67. Dexter Boniface & Ilan Alon, Is Hong Kong Democratizing?, 50 ASIAN SURVEY 786, 792 
(2010). 
 68. Albert Chen, Development of Representative Government, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG 
CONSTITUTION 219 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011). 
69.  MING SING, HONG KONG’S TORTUOUS DEMOCRATIZATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 36 
(2004). 
 70. John Burns et al., Changing Governance Structures and the Evolution of Public Services 
Bargains in Hong Kong, 79 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 135 (2012). 
 71. CARROLL, supra note 66, at 199.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Kathleen Cheek-Milby, The Changing Political Role of the Hong Kong Civil Servant, 62 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Instead of a proper cabinet, the Executive Council was more akin to a 
“sounding board” for policies, which mostly originated from the 
bureaucracy—albeit modified by suggestions from advisory committees 
drawn from local businesses and social elites.74 The Governor was 
technically omnipotent; though, admittedly, he rarely exercised his power 
at the expense of his civil service subordinates.75 
Since the early twentieth century, the Hong Kong civil service has 
earned a distinguished reputation for efficiency and integrity.76 As a cost-
conscious, meritocratic, benevolently authoritarian “bureaucratic polity” or 
“pure administrative state,” it has grounded its legitimacy77 on its policy 
output performance and its administrative legality.78 Since the 1970s, this 
largely clean bureaucracy has effectively implemented many important 
housing, health, education, and welfare reform programs that have lifted 
multitudes out of poverty, while conserving a minimalist approach to 
economic management on a macro level.79 Notably, the colonial civil 
service significantly outperformed those of most other East Asian 
countries and was on par with Singapore and Japan.80 Following the 1989 
Tiananmen Square incident, Governor Chris Patten’s expansion of direct 
legislative elections in response to the local populace’s growing fears 
about the 1997 transfer of sovereignty to China weakened bureaucratic 
dominance of politics and policy in the mid-1990s.81 
The post-1997 era began with China’s roll-back of the Patten reforms. 
Chee-hwa Tung, the first Chief Executive of Hong Kong appointed by 
Beijing to succeed the British Governor, wielded wide-ranging powers 
conferred by the Basic Law, which exceeded those of the majority of the 
world’s presidents, at least on paper.82 Yet, the problem of agency cost and 
administrative inefficiency is now far more prominent than it ever was in 
colonial times. The Chief Executive’s “Confucian” and “patriarchal” 
ideological tendencies, supported by the pro-China parties dominating the 
 
 
PAC. AFF. 219, 221 (1989). 
 74. IAN SCOTT, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG: REGIME CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON 
THE PUBLIC SECTOR 33 (2005). 
 75. Id. 
 76. CHARLES COLLINS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG: LONDON: ROYAL INSTITUTE 
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 77. SCOTT, supra note 74, at 36. 
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 79. See Anthony Cheung, Strong Executive, Weak Policy Capacity: The Changing Environment 
of Policy-making in Hong Kong, 12 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 2 (2004). 
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Legislative Council,83 eventually clashed with the policy preferences of 
the British-trained bureaucracy.84 
The Legislative Council and the Executive Authorities have become 
separately constituted under the Basic Law; civil servant-ministers no 
longer double as legislators. Nonetheless, the pro-China camp, to which 
the Chief Executive was a member, has always been the legislative 
majority in this 60-Member legislature.85 What is more, the new majority’s 
self-aggrandizing preferences steadily diverged from those of their civil 
service agents serving as ministers in the government.86 In many ways, the 
Legislative Council majority, if not also the Chief Executive, have 
remained “outsiders” to workaday policy making and implementation 
thanks to the severe information asymmetry between themselves and the 
bureaucracy.87 Notably, Chief Executive Tung and his supporters have 
chosen to believe that the civil service establishment is a relic of the past 
and a major source of administrative inefficiency.88 Partly because of 
exogenous shocks never experienced before by the bureaucracy, and partly 
because of discord between political principals and administrative agents, 
serious incidents of maladministration have transpired one after another. 
Some examples include the mishandling of the Avian Flu and the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome sagas, the public housing piling scandal, and 
conflicting housing policies that were widely believed to have caused the 
collapse of housing prices and perceived government-business collusion.89 
Consistent with the principal-agent model’s predictions, the Chief 
Executive has implemented a panoply of reforms aimed at enlarging 
politicians’ authority vis-à-vis public administrators, by appointing the 
leaders of the Legislative Council majority to non-portfolio positions on 
the Executive Council, by altering the employment status of civil servants, 
increasing outsourcing, corporatizing services, and by setting performance 
targets and efficiency-oriented goals.90 None of these reforms have 
 
 
 83. See GOODSTADT, supra note 64, at 138. 
 84. Richard Cullen, Xiaonan Yang & Christine Loh, Executive Government, in LAW OF THE 
HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 252–53 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011). 
 85. Li Pang-kwong, The Executive, in CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG GOVERNMENT AND 
POLITICS 34–35 (Lam Wai-man, Percy L. Lui & Wilson Wong eds., 2012). 
 86. Wilson Wong, The Civil Service, in CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG GOVERNMENT AND 
POLITICS 98 (Lam Wai-man, Percy L. Lui & Wilson Wong eds., 2012). 
 87. Id. at 89. 
 88. See generally Ian Scott, Legitimacy, Governance and Public Policy in Post-Handover Hong 
Kong, 29 ASIA PAC. J. PUB. ADMIN. 29, 39–40 (2007). 
 89. Wai Fung Lam, Coordinating the Government Bureaucracy in Hong Kong: An Institutional 
Analysis, 18 GOVERNANCE 633, 634 (2005).  
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touched administrative officials’ privileged positions, precisely because of 
the classical agency problem: ministers in charge of implementing public 
policies were themselves an integral part of the bureaucracy with adverse 
interests.91 Pursuing their own utility, civil servants have strongly resisted 
compensation reform, rallying instead around their entrenched belief that 
promotion must be rooted in seniority, not performance.92 
Now consider the oversight mechanisms, which have grown in number 
since the 1980s, available to the Legislative Council to control its 
administrative agents.93 The Legislative Council engages in “police patrol 
oversight”: direct inspection of defiant administrative behavior, which 
allows parliamentarians to proactively identify bureaucratic malfeasance 
and impose sanctions accordingly. For instance, the Legislative Council 
has sought to increase its control over the bureaucracy through policy 
panels and select committees.94 The Legislative Council (Power and 
Privileges) Ordinance was enacted just for this purpose.95 Nevertheless, 
“police patrols” have proved costly to the legislature given the scarcity of 
parliamentary time and resource. In fact, select committees armed with 
special investigative powers have not been deployed save for the most 
exceptional public controversies.96 
Apart from this, there is a plethora of “fire alarms” in the form of 
administrative tribunals, which are established by statute within the 
executive branch of government and enable individual citizens and interest 
groups to bring problematic administrative behavior to politicians’ 
attention.97 Major “fire alarms” include the Administrative Appeals Board, 
the flagship generalist administrative tribunal, and specialist tribunals such 
as the Immigration Tribunal, the Social Security Appeals Board, and the 
 
 
 91. BURNS, supra note 80, at 351. 
 92. Id. at 339–40. 
 93. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165 (1984). 
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HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINSTRATIVE REGION 349, 359–74 (Lau Siu-Kai ed., 2002). 
 95. Legislative Council (Power and Privileges) Ordinance, (1985) Cap. 382 (H.K.). 
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POLITICS 60–61 (Lam Wai-man, Percy L. Lui & Wilson Wong eds., 2012). 
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Energy Efficiency (Labelling of Products) Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 598 (H.K.); Board of Review under 
the Film Censorship Ordinance, (1988) Cap. 392 (H.K.); Appeal Board under the Construction 
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Health and Municipal Services Ordinance, (1960) Cap. 132 (H.K.). See ANDREW MAK, DISCIPLINARY 
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Appeal Board Panel (Town Planning).98 However, a leading public 
administration scholar has questioned the efficacy of the Administrative 
Appeals Board in light of its lack of publicity.99 Additionally, the Office of 
the Ombudsman is an institution that exhibits the characteristics of both 
“police patrols” and “fire alarms.” Nevertheless, it has been said to be an 
ineffective oversight device given its largely advisory and non-coercive 
nature.100 
The mechanism of appointments and dismissals is arguably the most 
powerful principal-agent control device to curb agency costs. However, 
the post-1997 Legislative Council is constitutionally incompetent to sack 
defiant bureaucrat-ministers and the Chief Executive’s ability to do so had 
been severely circumscribed by the Basic Law’s protection of civil 
servants’ tenure.101 Again in line with the principal-agent interpretation, 
the Legislative Council approved the Chief Executive’s initiative to 
reestablish his authority by restructuring the political system in 2002. The 
so-called “Principal Officials Accountability System” (“POAS”) replaced 
the civil servants, holding all fourteen ministerial positions, with political 
appointees selected by the Chief Executive.102 The rationale for the POAS 
was that it would maximize the Chief Executive’s control of the 
bureaucracy, as well as eliminate bureaucratic red tape and policy 
incoherence between the Executive Authorities and the Legislative 
Council.103 Unintended consequences, however, overwhelmed Tung’s 
scheme. The POAS aggravated agency costs and administrative 
inefficiencies. The new appointees had no organized political party 
background or network to rely on and functioned in many ways like an ad 
hoc group with little experience in public administration.104 Imperfect 
information made them depend on—and hence compromise with—public 
administrators to implement policies successfully.105 At the same time, 
mutual distrust and tensions between the old political executive (now the 
 
 
 98. SWATI JHAVERI ET AL., HONG KONG ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 76 (2010). 
 99. IAN SCOTT, THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN HONG KONG 287 (2010). 
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 101. See H.K.B.L. arts. 100, 103. 
 102. See Burns et al., supra note 70, at 135. 
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senior bureaucracy), and the new political executive (constituted by the 
Chief Executive’s own political appointees), created agency costs of its 
own, handicapping the governing capacity of the SAR Government as a 
whole.106 
Another major source of agency costs was administrative agency 
proliferation along with the increasing magnitude of their work. Numerous 
weighty decisions must be resolved at the administrative level due to the 
complexity of modern governance and the impracticability of foreseeing 
everything in legislation.107 Indeed, the Executive Authorities of the Hong 
Kong SAR are a highly complex organization. Horizontally, as of June 
2012, there are eleven Bureaus organized under the Department of 
Administration and the Department of Finance, five divisions under the 
Department of Justice, and more than 60 sub-departments and offices, 
each of which is highly specialized.108 Additionally, there are over 500 
statutory agencies and advisory committees addressing virtually every 
dimension of administration.109 They often wield extensive powers. For 
instance, the Housing Authority, established by the Housing Ordinance,110 
is charged with developing and implementing public housing programs. 
The Airport Authority, pursuant to the Airport Authority Ordinance,111 is 
entrusted with maximizing the value of Hong Kong International Airport, 
one of the largest and busiest airports in the world. The huge number of 
specialized agencies has inevitably aggrandized the range and impact of 
their own administrative decisions, effectively limiting and retarding the 
ability of the Legislative Council to police and impose appropriate and 
timely sanctions.112 In sum, the development of public administration in 
Hong Kong follows the predictions of the generalized principal-agent 
model. Administrative inefficiency as a consequence of principal-agent 
incongruence has become a real and pressing problem for Hong Kong’s 
political leaders. 
 
 
 106. See Burns et al., supra note 70, at 143. 
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III. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A. Overview 
Hong Kong administrative law is an anomaly in the general 
development of administrative law in other East Asian jurisdictions such 
as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. These latter countries are rooted in a 
Confucian past, reformed in adherence to German and American ideals, 
and structured to suit the needs of the developmental state.113 By contrast, 
judge-made law is the backbone of administrative law in Hong Kong. The 
territory’s administrative law doctrines derive their principles and 
practices directly from English administrative law, which dates back to the 
seventeenth century.114 The English courts did not acquire their judicial 
review competence from Acts of Parliament; instead, they asserted it for 
themselves.115 English administrative law entered a new phase in 1963 
when the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords revived the 
principles of natural justice;116 roughly two decades later, in just two 
decades, it was satisfied that judge-made administrative law principles 
were sophisticated enough to be classified into three main grounds for 
review in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service:117 
illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. 
Having inherited the Colony’s common law system, the courts of the 
Hong Kong SAR increasingly deal with challenges to administrative 
decisions. In the absence of any enabling legislation, the courts have 
maintained that their role in the judicial review of administrative acts is 
supervisory rather than appellate—they are concerned with the legality of 
agency decisions, not their merits.118 Applications for judicial review may 
be made in accordance with Order 53 of the Rules of High Court, modeled 
after the now defunct Order 53 of the Supreme Court of England and 
Wales.119 Appeals can be made to the Court of Appeal of the High Court, 
and ultimately, to the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, which as the 
 
 
 113. See generally John Ohnesorge, Administrative Law in East Asia: A Comparative Historical 
Analysis, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 78 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 
2011). 
 114. See Chen, supra note 9, at 11–12, 14.  
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 119. JHAVERI ET AL., supra note 98, at 117. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
242 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 12:227 
 
 
 
 
territory’s apex court, is wholly independent and autonomous from the 
Supreme People’s Court of China in Beijing. Applications are classified 
under the Constitutional and Administrative Law List, managed by a 
Judge of the Court of First Instance of the High Court. The Court’s 
judicial review competence stems from Subsections 21 I, J, and K of the 
High Court Ordinance, which enables it to issue writs of mandamus 
(directing compliance), prohibition (prohibiting acts), and certiorari 
(quashing unlawful proceedings) upon reviewing administrative 
conduct.120 Applications for judicial review have risen steadily, beginning 
with the final phase of British rule. Only 29 applications for judicial 
review were filed in 1988.121 Their increase only stabilized in the mid-
2000s, at 150 per year on average.122 The rise has notably paralleled the 
increase of agency costs to the Legislative Council during the same period. 
This section argues that administrative law doctrines show an implicit 
economic logic by seeking efficient administration through a system of 
incentives and disincentives. Legal doctrines consist of rules and standards 
explicit or implicit in judicial opinions, which set the terms for resolution 
of future cases under similar circumstances and may be confined to certain 
facts or sweepingly broad.123 Administrative law doctrines stemming from 
legality review, rationality review, and procedural review mitigate agency 
costs by facilitating the Legislative Council’s monitoring of administrative 
conduct, reducing agency discretion, and holding agency decision-making 
processes to implicit cost-benefit tests. While judicial review may promote 
administrative efficiency by credibly threatening to strike down decisions 
contrary to administrative law, it must be noted that judges are themselves 
in a sense agents of the legislature124 and may try to impose their own 
preferences on policy outcomes.125 This issue will be addressed in Part IV. 
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B. Legality Review 
Statutes enacted by the Legislative Council may be analyzed not only 
as policy bargains struck between the pro-China, and sometimes also Pan-
Democratic, partisan factions, but also as principal-agent contracts 
between legislators and administrative agents that instruct the latter on 
how to achieve the intentions of the former. Indeed, the very structures and 
competences of administrative agencies, as well as their objectives, are 
usually founded by statute,126 elaborated in delegated legislation, and 
supplemented by practices and procedures in internal circulars, 
memoranda, and the like.127 The most common problem principal-agent 
contracts attempt to address is that of agent drift, which occurs when 
administrators adopt agenda inconsistent with the agreements forged 
between legislators and executive officials, causing many of the ills of 
administrative inefficiency.128 
The doctrine of ultra vires has always been considered by the Hong 
Kong courts to be a fundamental principle of administrative law.129 The 
doctrine focuses judicial attention on boundary maintenance, that is, the 
issue of whether the administrator has stayed within the zone of discretion 
conferred on it by the Legislative Council. Yet merely bringing 
administrators into strict compliance with statutory provisions taken out of 
context does not necessarily lead to sensible judicial outcomes.130 Thus, in 
determining whether an administrative act is in fact ultra vires, the courts 
normally focus on the purposes of the governing statute. Importantly, the 
Court of Final Appeal has made a distinction between a statute’s ends (viz. 
policy bargains) and the means (viz. principal-agent contracts) to 
accomplish them. It was prepared to recognize as intra vires an agency’s 
discretion whether to use statutorily provided means so long as it is 
exercised in pursuit of the statutory ends.131 In other words, the essence of 
legality was based in the agencies’ furtherance of the statutory purpose 
regardless of their own choice of means, provided the lawfulness of the 
means themselves.132 This judicial doctrine is consistent with the ideals of 
 
 
 126. See JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE 
PUBLIC LAW 124 (1997). 
 127. Chan, supra note 18, at 149. 
 128. See generally Kenneth Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: 
A Comment on Macey, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 111 (1992). 
 129. RICHARD GORDON & JOHNNY MOK, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN HONG KONG 70 (2009). 
 130. See Cass Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 1989 DUKE L. J. 522, 536 (1989). 
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administrative efficiency because agencies are often better positioned to 
choose the most efficient means in pursuit of statutory ends given their 
informational advantages over courts. 
Doctrines correcting agency drift from lawmakers’ preferences 
embodied in statutory ends are accordingly sanctioned.133 First, Hong 
Kong courts have generally followed a landmark House of Lords case134 in 
holding that statutory “ouster clauses,” which purport to exempt certain 
classes of administrative tribunal acts from judicial review, protect only 
decisions made intra vires.135 Acts found ultra vires are amenable to 
review notwithstanding an ouster clause.136 Second, the Legislative 
Council is presumed to allow agencies to relate the evidence that they 
consider to the reasons governing their administrative acts; inability to do 
so is regarded as failure to act on a rational, evidentiary basis.137 Third, an 
act may be invalidated if the agency fails to take account of “relevant 
considerations.”138 The relevancy principle implies that courts elicit and 
assess all factors that served as a basis for agency acts.139 For instance, any 
administrative act lacking evidential support is ultra vires.140 In fact, one 
of the main groundbreaking doctrinal advancements of the Court of Final 
Appeal is to classify “substantive legitimate expectations” as one of the 
“relevant considerations” agencies must take into account,141 in the 
absence of any precedent from major apex courts in the Commonwealth, 
including the United Kingdom House of Lords, the Canadian Supreme 
Court, and the Australian High Court.142 The substantive legitimate 
expectation doctrine holds that failure to honor a legitimate expectation—a 
promise, representation, practice, or policy made by a public body—may 
 
 
 133. See generally Benny Tai, The Administrative Litigation System in Hong Kong, in CROSS-
STRAIT, FOUR-REGION: LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN, CHINA, HONG KONG AND MACAU, VOLUME 
ONE: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION (D.T.C. Tang & P.H. Wang eds., 
2007). 
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 137. Incorp. Owners of Wah Kai Indust. Ctr., [2000] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 268, ¶ 35 (H.K.). 
 138. JHAVERI ET AL., supra note 98, at 334. 
 139. See M. Elizabeth Magill & Daniel R. Ortiz, Comparative Positive Political Theory, in 
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 134, 141 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2011). 
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Pub. Serv. (Discipline) Regulation and Section 10 of the Pub. Serv. (Administration) Order 1997, 
[2005] H.K.E.C. 65 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
 141. Ng Siu Tung v. The Dir. of Immigration, [2002] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 561, 600–01 (C.F.A.) (H.K.). 
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cause immense unfair harm, constituting an unlawful abuse of power.143 
Notably, an act involving a political or policy choice is not exempt from 
the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation; failure to consider such 
an expectation is considered failure to take account of relevant 
considerations.144 This helps promote agencies’ commitment to its own 
promises—an invaluable asset in the long run145—by imposing transaction 
costs on those that indulge in cheap talk that will eventually undermine the 
interests of the legislature. Fourth, an act is unlawful if the administrator 
took account of an “irrelevant consideration.”146 Administrative bodies are 
prohibited to exercise statutory means for non-statutory ends and to act 
under the influence of irrelevant considerations, including taking into 
account incorrect factual findings.147 Administrators are thus encouraged 
to use their scarce resources in the efficient achievement of statutory goals, 
eschewing considerations that have little or no role to play. 
Statutes sometimes vest administrators with broad discretion to balance 
the pursuit of competing ends. In such cases, the Court of Final Appeal 
endeavors to push agencies toward cost-benefit optimality in their 
decisional processes. Consider Society for the Protection of the Harbour 
Limited v. Town Planning Board,148 where the Town Planning Board’s 
proposals to reclaim the scenic and symbolic Victoria Harbour was 
challenged as ultra vires under the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance,149 
wherein Section 3 raises a presumption against such reclamation. The 
Court found the Board acted ultra vires in treating the statutory 
presumption as a mere material consideration to be given ordinary 
attention.150 Instead, the Court found that the Board should have given the 
presumption more weight and formulated the “overriding public needs” 
test. The Court held: 
The statute, in conferring on the harbour a unique legal status, 
recognises the strong public need to protect and preserve it. The 
 
 
 143. Id. at 600. 
 144. Id. at 601. 
 145. Stefan Voigt, Constitutional Political Economy: Analyzing Formal Institutions at the Most 
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statute envisages that irreversible loss to the extent of the 
reclamation would only be justified where there is a much stronger 
public need to override the statutory principle of protection and 
preservation.151  
It further defined that “overriding public need” does not rest on 
extremes: it is neither no more than “desirable, preferable, or beneficial,” 
nor nothing less than what the public cannot function without,152 but rather 
an economic, environmental, or social need that cannot be fulfilled by any 
reasonable, available alternative.153 Consequently, it is incumbent on the 
Board to prove with “cogent and convincing evidence”154 that its proposal 
has such economic or social benefit to some as would justify the 
environmental or cultural cost imposed on others. Echoing the logic of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the Court has, in effect, permitted the 
“preferences of both winners and losers [to] enter into a principled 
framework” wherein “the weighing of opposing preferences is explicit.”155 
On remand to the Town Planning Board for reconsideration, the proposed 
reclamation was substantially scaled back and a government committee 
was set up to scrutinize any future Board proposals in light of the 
considerable opposition to the Harbour reclamation.156 
Similarly, in Shiu Wing Steel Ltd v. Director of Environmental 
Protection & Airport Authority (No. 2),157 the Court of Final Appeal struck 
down the Director of Environmental Protection’s approval of the Airport 
Authority’s proposed aviation fuel storage facility on the grounds that it 
might credibly threaten life and property in the neighborhood. The 
proposal was alleged necessary to meet the expected demand for fuel at 
the Hong Kong International Airport. The ruling implied a cost-benefit 
analysis that weighs the interests of those benefitting from environmental 
protection against those advantaged by timely implementation of public 
projects. The Court condemned the environmental agency’s failure to 
conduct quantitative risk assessments for disaster scenarios that put human 
life at risk and, accordingly, held that project assessments must go beyond 
merely predicted risks to embrace the full statistical range of scenarios that 
 
 
 151. Id. at 17. 
 152. Id.  
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 155. See John Graham, Saving Lives through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 395, 411 (2008). 
 156. Chan, supra note 18, at 162. 
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include estimates of fatalities.158 The Court’s reasoning, however 
imperfect, implied that the loss of human life is a critical social cost and 
the extent to which such an irretrievable loss potentially exists must be 
carefully assessed. Indeed, a project cannot be Kaldor-Hicks-efficient 
unless the beneficiaries can in principle compensate the disadvantaged; no 
project beneficiary, even if they wanted to, could compensate for the lives 
that were lost. 
Enabling statutes alone cannot self-execute the will of the political 
principals, nor guarantee that agencies do not drift away from it.159 In sum, 
ultra vires doctrines have been designed to enforce the preferences of the 
legislature as embodied in statutory provisions.160 These doctrines 
constitute a common law framework in which judges and litigants can 
identify agent drift to ensure the efficiency of administrators’ compliance 
with regulatory and enabling acts without imposing excessive opportunity 
and transaction costs on the Legislative Council. 
C. Rationality Review 
   Legislators cannot foresee every contingency. Practical necessity obliges 
them to render their statutory instructions in terms that are general and, in 
a sense, incomplete. As a result, administrative agencies charged with 
implementing statutes inevitably exercise wide-ranging discretionary 
powers, which may or may not be used in coherence with the ideals of 
administrative efficiency. The Hong Kong courts, following their English 
counterparts, have undertaken “rationality” review, constructing additional 
constraints on administrative acts beyond the precepts of statutory 
construction. The classical rule known as “Wednesbury unreasonableness” 
allows courts to invalidate acts “so absurd that no sensible person could 
ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority”161 or a decision 
“so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to 
it.”162  
In Hong Kong, rationality review is conceptually distinct from legality 
review. Even when an administrative decision is intra vires, courts may 
still strike it down due to such factors as extreme inconsistencies and 
logical flaws.163 Although some cases have conserved the traditional 
 
 
 158. Id. at 481, 508, 513–16. 
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 160. JHAVERI ET AL., supra note 132, at 6. 
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Wednesbury test,164 the Hong Kong courts have articulated important 
modifications that relaxed the stringent structure of “irrationality” 
doctrines. Indeed, “considerable diversity” is found in the willingness of 
courts to scrutinize the merits of administrative acts beyond strict 
unreasonableness.165 An administrator’s failure to deal with important 
factors could be regarded as not only illegal, but also as irrational.166 The 
High Court (Court of First Instance) nullified as “irrational” an act by the 
Telecommunications Authority, which imposed its policy views on a cable 
television license holder even though the license did not allow such 
imposition.167 The same court has also invalidated an act of the 
Telecommunication Authority based on the Authority’s failure to include 
interim terms and conditions in licenses at the expense of the commercial 
interests of the parties to the case.168 And it has accepted that 
administratively imposed penalties that ignore all rational relation between 
“the seriousness of the offence and the situation of the offender,”169 or 
“excessive and out of proportion” has to be nullified.170 The concept of 
proportionality is a special species of cost-benefit analysis, which asks 
whether the costs of the administrative decision are excessive with regard 
to the benefits.171 By extension, disproportionate administrative penalties 
are likely to be Kaldor-Hicks inefficient.  
The High Court (Court of First Instance) extended these doctrines by 
ruling that the Chief Executive-in-Council’s decision to approve a Victoria 
Harbor reclamation plan (based on evidence drawn from an engineering 
report endorsed by an independent university expert) should be subject to 
a “heightened scrutiny test,” given the Harbor’s “unique legal status” 
pursuant to the Protection of Harbour Ordinance.172 Arguments and 
evidence submitted in support of such an important decision must “on 
their face” be “reasonable” and of “relevance.”173 Rationality review thus 
 
 
 164. See, e.g., Chu Yee Wah v. Dir. of Env’l Prot., [2011] 3 H.K.C. 227 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
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233, 235 (2006). 
 166. Pun Tai Sung v. Immigration Tribunal, [2006] H.K.E.C. 2013, ¶ 51 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
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 169. See Wong Wai Tak v. Sec’y for Civil Serv., [2001] H.K.E.C. 167, ¶ 40 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
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Kwok Leong v. Sec’y for the Civil Serv., [2011] H.K.C.F.I. 459, ¶ 2 (C.F.I.) (H.K.); see also Liu Pik 
Han v. Hong Kong Fed’n of Insurers Appeal Tribunal, [2005] H.K.C.F.I. 539, ¶ 50 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
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requires that a logical nexus always exists between the means adopted by 
agencies and the statutory ends. They are designed for the comprehensive 
assessment of whether the chosen course of action is consistent with the 
governing statute and also whether the power of choice was soundly 
exercised.174 Outrageous and irrational administrative acts are usually 
more costly than beneficial to those affected by them. Rationality review 
does not formally require administrators to adopt Kaldor-Hicks cost-
benefit analyses, but they do help courts scale back inefficient 
administrative impediments. Besides, rationality review limits 
administrator discretion to pursue unsound policies that stray too far from 
the preferences of the legislature. Accordingly, they potentially free the 
Legislative Council of political blame for the outrageous acts of its 
administrative agents. 
D. Procedural Review 
Legislatures ordinarily impose procedural requirements of various sorts 
on the decisional processes of administrative bodies. Procedural 
requirements may be understood as devices for achieving the goals of 
optimal political control.175 They do so by increasing the transaction costs 
to administrators, in terms of time and resources, of pursuing courses of 
action inconsistent with legislative preferences as expressed in statutory 
goals.176 As mentioned above, Hong Kong, unlike Taiwan or Japan, does 
not have an American-style Administrative Procedures Act to impose 
statutorily sanctioned procedural constraints on agency behavior. Hong 
Kong courts have instead required administrators to adhere to the 
procedures set forth in individual Legislative Council enactments, but 
additional to this, they have supplemented the legislature with other 
procedural safeguards that promote fairer outcomes.177 For example, the 
judicial doctrine of procedural legitimate expectation has been brought to 
bear to impose procedural constraints on agencies (namely hearings 
legitimately anticipated by persons affected by administrative acts) over 
and above those mandated by statute. 
 
 
 174. See generally Yeung Cheong Fat v. An Investigation Comm. Appointed Pursuant to Section 
6 of the Pub. Serv. (Discipline) Regulation and Section 10 of the Pub. Serv. (Administration) Order 
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 177. So Chung v. Comm’r of Corr. Serv., [2001] H.K.C.F.I. 1107, ¶¶ 21–22 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
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The Court of Final Appeal averred that “the purpose of judicial 
review,” in the procedural review of agency adjudication, “is to ensure 
procedural fairness, observance of the rules of natural justice, and the 
prevention of excess or abuse of power;” administrative tribunals must 
therefore act “in a manner which was not only fair but seen to be fair.”178 
There is no fixed set of procedural rules that the courts must apply in 
every single instance of administrative action: the courts are to choose the 
appropriate doctrines with regard to the context of the impugned acts,179 
and procedural demands will vary according to “[t]he character of the 
decision-making body, the nature of the decision, and the statutory or 
other framework in which it operates.”180  
While the Legislative Council has drafted some statutes to require 
administrators to give reasons for their acts,181 the courts have decided that 
no general legal duty requires them to do so, but have in various 
circumstances required administrators to give reasons. The High Court 
(Court of First Instance) has acknowledged a growing judicial trend 
insisting on greater transparency of administrative proceedings, and courts 
increasingly lean toward an administrative duty to give reasons for their 
decisions.182 Such a duty, when enforced, obligates administrators to spend 
more of their scarce resources on improving their decisional processes and 
less on dreaming up policies that they cannot justify on their face.183 
Administrative law also faults administrators that exhibit “apparent” bias. 
It is of the essence in Hong Kong law that courts are seen as impartial, 
especially when agencies adjudicate.184 The test of a tribunal’s impartiality 
is whether the conduct of the proceedings would cause a fair-minded and 
“informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility . . . that 
the tribunal was biased.”185 Rules such as this may be understood as 
designed to reduce agency costs and promote administrative efficiency 
insofar as biased agencies are likely to overvalue their own or third-party 
 
 
 178. Fin. Sec’y v. Felix Wong (2003) 6 H.K.C.F.A.R. 476, ¶¶ 35–48 (C.F.A.) (H.K.) 
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 183. Emerson Tiller, Resource-Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political Theory: Cost-
Benefit Analysis and the Like, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1452, 1459 (2002). 
 184. Michael John Treloar Rowse v. The Sec’y for the Civil Serv., [2008] 5 H.K.L.R.D. 217, ¶ 61 
(C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
 185. Deacons v. White & Case LLP, [2003] 6 H.K.C.F.A.R. 322, ¶ 20 (C.F.A.) (H.K.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2013] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 251 
 
 
 
 
interests. Appearances count: administrative decision-makers who seem 
biased may well have allowed inappropriate concerns, like favoritism or 
pecuniary self-interest, actually to affect their judgment.186 Administrative 
law thus reduces administrative bias by increasing the transaction costs 
(efforts and resources devoted to minimizing even perceived lack of 
neutrality) of enacting policies that the administrator prefers more strongly 
than the median member of the Legislative Council.187 
While no absolute rule requires an adjudicating agency to grant an oral 
hearing to the parties in interest, the courts have held that a hearing may be 
required in some situations, such as disputes that involve the credibility of 
a witness or party.188 Procedural review doctrines nudge private interests 
toward policing agency malfeasance, lending aggrieved citizens a sense of 
vindication.189 Courts have increasingly granted parties adversely affected 
by an impending agency act an opportunity to be consulted before the act 
is carried out.190 Such consultation allows agencies to acquire relevant 
information from those who may be affected by particular acts, facilitating 
the weighing of costs and benefits before final outcomes are reached 
indirectly.191 Additionally, the enforcement of this set of procedures is 
decentralized in the sense that it does not require any direct action by the 
Legislative Council and so spares the opportunity costs of individual 
legislators.192 
Above all, the mechanism of procedural review facilitates optimal 
political control by providing legislators, interest groups, and the general 
public with more information on the bureaucracy, thereby reducing the 
information asymmetry between them. More information is better than 
less as for principals;193 legislators can only reward and punish agents 
when they can evaluate their performance.194 The expanded formulae of 
procedural review conduce to the legislature having the requisite 
information to perform oversight of agency conduct if necessary, 
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furnished by the various discovery processes springing from the rules of 
natural justice.195 
E. Offsetting Judicial Agency Costs 
Globally, administrative law “reflects a tension between two 
fundamental impulses that pull in opposite directions”: administrative 
power has to be constrained in order to be legitimate on the one hand; the 
distribution of discretionary power to administrative agencies is crucial to 
effective government on the other.196 Courts may undermine 
administrative efficiency if they intervene excessively in the 
administrative process, imposing their own preferences on agencies and 
legislators. This would “rob agencies of their effectiveness”197 and incur 
another kind of agency costs—judicial agency costs.198 Inconsistent 
application of administrative law rules may breed uncertainty among 
agencies, driving them to adopt defensive, risk-averse courses of action 
that may just as easily compromise the achievement of statutory goals and 
upset administrative efficiency.199 Given information asymmetry, 
reviewing courts may sometimes be tempted to act inconsistently with the 
preferences of the Legislative Council. 
The courts, apparently recognizing these pitfalls, have tied their own 
hands with a set of deferential doctrines. On balance, courts have been 
cautious about interfering in administrative decisions, and judicial review 
applicants have been disappointed in most cases.200 Between 2000 and 
2008, the courts affirmed the lawfulness of administrative acts in eighty 
percent of all cases.201 This is partly due to courts applying deference 
doctrines countervailing the potential judicial overreach that might disrupt 
the status quo.202 Courts are forbidden to substitute their own policy 
preferences for those of administrators.203 In practice, there is a general 
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judicial deference to the Executive Authorities.204 They have expressed 
reluctance to attack agency acts merely because they are unfair.205 The 
Hong Kong courts have been conscious to keep their own acts within the 
bounds of statutorily permissible judicial behavior. Courts have ruled 
against judicial intervention in cases where the Legislative Council gave 
“absolute discretion” to an agency on a certain matter unless the agency 
exercised its discretion unlawfully.206 Courts must not interfere with the 
Legislative Council’s delegation to agencies of different, sometimes 
overlapping powers, and the broader agency competence contained in one 
statute must not be circumscribed to meet the requirements of another 
statute.207 
The courts have also toned down potentially activist doctrines by 
hedging them with important qualifications. For example, the Court of 
Final Appeal, domesticating the Wednesbury doctrine, has admonished the 
lower courts that,  
Where a departmental head of government is entrusted by the 
legislature with administrative responsibilities it is not for the courts 
to say how those responsibilities should be discharged. It is only 
where the administrator has acted beyond the range of responses 
reasonably open to him under the statutory scheme that the court’s 
power of intervention . . . can properly be invoked.208 
Under the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation, some courts 
have expressed reluctance to interpret expansively the content of the 
administrative promise relied on; if the language of the promise is capable 
of more than one interpretation, judges should accept the agency’s version 
of what they intended the promise to mean.209 Indeed, the Court of Final 
Appeal itself has declared, “when [the courts] enforce legitimate 
expectations substantively (rather than merely procedurally) . . . [they] 
must take particular care to avoid trespassing upon the policy preserve of 
the executive.”210 The courts have also explicitly declined to recognize the 
doctrine of proportionality, which among other things requires the courts 
to assess the legitimacy of an impugned decision’s underlying motives, as 
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a free-standing basis of judicial review outside of the contexts of human 
rights and excessive penalties,211 and have ruled that the burden of proving 
an allegation of actual bias rests with the applicants.212 
Eschewing the rigorous Pareto efficiency standard, which forbids 
bettering the welfare of one at the expense of another, and judges 
conducting substantive cost-benefit tests, Hong Kong courts have confined 
themselves to preventing agent drift and promoting more lenient Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency in the decisional processes of agencies, without 
interfering with substantive outcomes. Indeed, an efficient regime of 
administrative law does not enthrone the courts as public overseers, but 
merely checks if agencies are acting in line with their statutory mandates, 
not their self-interest.213 Recall that the legislature’s delegation of 
discretion to administrative agencies is typically justified by their superior 
expertise. The taboo against substituting judicial policy preferences for 
agencies’ preferences reflects an assumption that, ceteris paribus, policy 
judgments of agencies are more likely to translate legislative preferences 
the best.214 The competence of courts to control agencies’ proceedings 
wanes in proportion as these become more technical or more politicized.215  
F. Strategic Case Selection 
Apparently recognizing that judicial review is only useful if it reduces 
agency costs,216 the courts have strategically crafted the rules of standing 
and reviewability to select only the “right” cases to review and to conserve 
their own scarce organizational resources. Hong Kong’s multifaceted 
administrative state occasionally sees agencies engaging in private 
business dealings; out of principles derived from English common law, 
therefore, the courts have elaborated doctrines to screen out certain 
appeals. It is axiomatic in Hong Kong law that judicial scrutiny of an act is 
founded not only on the source, but also on the nature of the acting 
organization’s power.217 For example, an agency’s “purely commercial” 
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decision, such as to award contracts or to purchase goods, is not 
reviewable absent fraud, corruption, or bad faith.218 To be reviewable, an 
act “must be one of a public nature as opposed to one of a purely private or 
domestic character.”219 The High Court (Court of First Instance) has 
declared:  
[T]he presence of a public element(s) of sufficient significance in 
the decision-making process could turn an otherwise commercial 
decision into a public law decision, amenable to judicial review. . . . 
[T]he crucial question is whether the role played or function 
performed by the Government official is sufficiently public to 
render the decision a public one, susceptible to judicial review.220  
As well as satisfying the public role test, judicial review appellants 
usually have to meet those principles of standing under the House of Lords 
ruling of O’Reilly v. Mackman,221 which held it was an abuse of judicial 
process to allow applicants to challenge a public act without following the 
special review procedures provided in Order 53 of the Rules of the High 
Court. The Court of Final Appeal noted that applications not in strict 
compliance with Order 53 have become an “extravaganza,” which the 
High Court (Court of First Instance) should stop.222 Exceptions from 
compliance with Order 53 are acceptable only in limited circumstances, 
such as when the applicant had no intention of evading it.223 The rules of 
standing have also been changed in light of the recent development that 
“activists” increasingly pursue judicial review litigation to attract public 
attention, promote their ideology, and boost their bargaining power vis-à-
vis the government.224 The Court has responded by tightening the standing 
test for judicial review applicants, ruling that leave will only be granted to 
“arguable,” not just “potentially arguable” applications.225 This is 
consistent with the view that judicial review must usefully promote 
administrative efficiency on behalf of the legislature and its constituencies, 
and only in cases that the courts are interested in and capable of handling. 
Doctrinal tendencies to offset judicial agency costs and protect the 
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administrative state from certain classes of challenges regardless of 
plausibly negative effects on administrative fairness and the protection of 
human rights evidence that rule-of-law values do not necessarily dominate 
the calculus of reviewing courts. 
G. Why Efficiency? 
This section attempts to conjecture why Hong Kong administrative law 
doctrines resemble decisional devices that promote administrative 
efficiency. Consider first what is not claimed: it is not asserted that judicial 
application of administrative law will automatically lead to efficient 
outcomes. A persistent risk in the modern regulatory environment is that 
judicial review could trigger reactions from the political branches and 
interest groups that would render the administrative process less efficient 
than it would without such intervention.226 Equally, efficient doctrines are 
not necessarily applied perfectly. As Secretary for Justice Wong Yan-lung 
said in a 2008 speech, “misconceived judicial reviews, apart from being 
costly for the community, may also cause unnecessary uncertainty, 
interruption or delay to essential public works,” and public administrators, 
to shield themselves from judicial scrutiny, “may become inclined to 
promulgate more rules, turning into excessive regulatory fetters, which in 
turn may generate more judicial reviews.”227 Nor is it claimed that 
administrative efficiency is an explicit or the overriding ideal pursued by 
Hong Kong courts; indeed, efficiency is extremely controversial when 
made the overriding pursuit of legal institutions.228 What is claimed is that 
judge-made administrative law may be understood as conducive to the 
promotion of administrative efficiency as if judges had intended it: 
administrative law doctrines are economically sensible notwithstanding 
that they are not expressly economic.229 While judges and traditional legal 
scholars tend to think that concerns for justice and fairness predominate in 
the evolution of legal doctrines, this article has attempted to show that 
these doctrines are no less premised on functional and instrumental 
considerations.230 It is important to note that although many of the former 
colony’s administrative law doctrines originated in the United Kingdom, it 
is unnecessary to inquire why English judges ever designed these 
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administrative law doctrines in the first place, as after 1997 the Hong 
Kong Court of Final Appeal was no longer bound by Privy Council 
precedents, given the termination of Hong Kong’s British Empire 
membership. Essentially, the Court has been left on its own to develop the 
SAR’s own local rules of public administration in unprecedented 
circumstances to suit the needs of the “new” Hong Kong.  
Consider the case of Singapore as a useful “controlled experiment” to 
illustrate the significant correlation between rapid growth of 
administrative law and proliferation of administrative agency costs. 
Singapore, like Hong Kong, is a common law jurisdiction and former 
British dependency. Both jurisdictions have been “newly industrialized 
economies” or “Asian Tigers,” characterized by relative political stability, 
the complex cohabitation of authoritarian politics and flourishing capitalist 
economies, high levels of education, and low levels of corruption.231 
However, the path of administrative law in each of these jurisdictions 
diverges significantly from each other. Similar to British Hong Kong but 
dissimilar to the Hong Kong SAR, principal-agent incongruence is a non-
problem for Singapore’s rulers. The People’s Action Party (“PAP”) has 
commanded a supermajority of votes in the Parliament of Singapore since 
the country gained independence in 1965.232 Government ministers, 
including the Prime Minister, are invariably drawn from incumbent PAP 
parliamentarians under the Westminster model. There is little space for 
judicial review of administrative action given the extensive overlap of 
principal-agent interests and the effective role of the PAP Government in 
resolving any residue agency problem.  
Despite superficially resembling their Hong Kong counterparts due to 
the two city-state’s common British inheritance, Singapore’s 
administrative law doctrines have neither been extended nor invoked to 
control agency costs: merely seventy nine judicial review decisions were 
reported throughout the fifty three years between 1957 and 2008;233 the 
courts have not yet domesticated more rigorous doctrines such as 
substantive legitimate expectation and proportionality;234 and as of 2011, 
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“the development of administrative law was still in its infancy.”235 
However, the fact that Singapore’s administrative law has made much less 
progress than that of Hong Kong does not necessarily suggest that the 
former is less efficient than the latter. In Singapore’s administrative state, 
agency problems are mostly negligible and non-judicial oversight 
mechanisms tend to be reliable. These are factors that substantially reduce 
political demand for judicial oversight. Any wholesale transplantation of 
Hong Kong’s administrative law doctrines into Singapore, by implication, 
is likely to unleash severe inefficiencies in government decision-making, 
and vice versa.   
The mechanism driving most judicial doctrines towards efficiency is 
invisible.236 Three conjectures, open to further empirical testing in the 
future, might be tentatively offered. First, judges might have a taste for 
promoting administrative efficiency, which would enhance their reputation 
among citizens, interest groups, legislators, and government officials, 
because optimal judicial oversight tends to improve the quality of 
government decision-making. They might desire to safeguard popular 
support for the Court, to be embraced by the social and business elite, or to 
maintain personal friendships with members of the other branches of 
government.237 Note also that the Basic Law provides that courts are to 
“exercise judicial power independently, free from any interference,”238 and 
that “the judicial system previously practiced in Hong Kong shall be 
maintained except for those changes consequent upon the establishment of 
the Court of Final Appeal.”239 The entrenched constitutional rules and 
political practices that support (yet hem in) judicial independence tend to 
reduce the likelihood of judges using the office for any purpose other than 
acquiring judicial reputation.240 Successive Chief Executives of Hong 
Kong have expressed a strong desire for efficient bureaucracy as 
evidenced by their administrative reforms, and the Legislative Council 
would never have delegated to agencies had it not wanted its preferences, 
embodied in statutes, to be implemented. Administrative law doctrines, in 
constraining agencies to the advantage of the legislature, and sometimes 
also interest groups and individual citizens, have the potential of 
enhancing the reputation of courts. The courts’ extremely high affirmation 
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rate of impugned administrative decisions enables judges to win the trust 
of those occupying the higher echelons of policy and administrative 
decision-making. 
Second, policy-seeking courts, if they wish to maintain their review 
prerogatives or implement their own preferences, might be under tacit 
political pressure to adopt and develop administratively efficient doctrines. 
Judicial oversight on the consistency of administrative acts with statutory 
law and minimal requirements of efficiency cannot be taken for granted 
under authoritarian regimes.241 Given the proliferation of agency costs and 
administrative inefficiencies and weaknesses in non-judicial oversight 
mechanisms described in Part II above, it would not be surprising if the 
Legislative Council was willing to experiment with alternative agency 
cost-control devices, if not actually finding the courts’ work politically 
useful. Furthermore, administratively inefficient judicial doctrines, which 
hamper the faithful implementation of statutory objectives by agencies, are 
particularly prone to attack by legislators via statutory reversals, 
jurisdictional limits, and outright non-compliance. Courts must craft 
doctrines that make the legislature better off in order to preserve the 
competitiveness of judicial oversight over other means of control (e.g., 
“police patrols” and “fire alarms”).242 
Third, there is a practical need for judges to conserve scarce resources 
and speed their adjudicative and rule-making work.243 Efficient 
administrative law doctrines are mentally economical, nudging judges 
toward resolving disputes quicker by not meddling with the philosophical 
underpinnings of normative principles (unless they elect to do so).244 
Because courts lack expertise in substantive policy issues, it is natural for 
them to concentrate instead on statutory interpretation, something they are 
indisputably better equipped to handle.245 Moreover, inefficient doctrines 
tend to instigate more complicated disputes than efficient ones; thus 
overburdening the courts.246 Judges are, however, well positioned to 
witness repeatedly the consequences of applying a given doctrine to actual 
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cases, which may nudge them to make marginal adjustments that render 
their doctrines more efficient.247 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In contemporary Hong Kong, administrative law grew in tandem with 
the expansion of the administrative state. Judicial review of administrative 
action has become more influential than ever notwithstanding the transfer 
of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to the People’s Republic of 
China, and the semi-authoritarian constitutional framework set up by the 
Basic Law. The mainstream literature has overlooked the fact that 
administrative law doctrines may have been developed, inter alia, to 
promote administrative efficiency in response to rising agency costs and 
the shortcomings of existing principal-agent control mechanisms such as 
the Legislative Council’s “police patrols” and “fire alarms” in the form of 
administrative tribunals. In addressing this gap, this article has sought to 
provide a superior empirically based explanation of these doctrines for the 
post-1997 era. To do so, it has adopted a theoretical framework, borrowing 
from law and economics and positive political theory, within which it was 
shown how the courts of the Hong Kong SAR have assisted the 
Legislative Council to exercise optimal control over agency action and 
agencies to deliver Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcomes with the doctrinal 
mechanisms of legality, rationality, and procedural review, while leaving 
to the legislature and the bureaucracy the substantive content of socio-
economic policy together with its efficiency levels. 
Despite the aggravation of agency costs and administrative 
inefficiencies after 1997, recent comparative surveys of government 
performance continue to highly rank the Hong Kong civil service.248 
Judicial review of administrative action may not be the proximate cause of 
efficient public administration, but it likely exerts a positive influence on 
administrative conduct. Policy proposals must now undergo a Judicial 
Review Test in the formulation stage to ensure that they do not breach this 
judge-made law.249 The mere threat of judicial intervention, rather than 
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actual invalidation by the courts, is often sufficient to deter agency 
defiance of statutory mandates and minimal criteria of economic 
efficiency. The utility of judge-made administrative law thus helps explain 
why Hong Kong lawmakers and mainland China political decision-makers 
have been so tolerant to the courts’ encroachment of the administrative 
process, even if some judicial decisions have brought government officials 
occasional inconvenience. 
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